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Attorneys, the Internet, and Hate Speech:
An Argument for an Amended Model Rule 8.4
By Jefferey Ogden Katz & Alexander I. Passo
ABSTRACT
Since the invention of the internet, our lives have changed dramatically.
Conveying ideas and information to broad audiences has become much
simpler, as all types of ideas are now shared—including hateful ones
targeted at minority groups.
The internet is a bastion for hate speech within the United States. There
are countless discriminatory posts circulated online daily, often by those
who are meant to protect us. Unfortunately, attorneys frequently take part
in this. National headlines have been made due to attorneys’ and judges’
controversial online posts, frequently targeting minorities. This has become
a problem, as public perception of these professions is undermined when
this occurs. Attorneys as administrators of justice should not make public
discriminatory statements, as our legal system must be color blind. When
officers of the court make discriminatory statements, this conduct runs afoul
of what our legal system is working to create—a United States where all its
citizens feel equally protected by the law as granted by the Fourteenth
Amendment.
This article first analyzes the First Amendment and hate speech. It then
provides a summary of how attorneys’ First Amendment rights have been
constitutionally restricted in comparison to the general public. In
conclusion, this article argues that a new Model Rule should be adopted by
the American Bar Association (ABA) that prohibits attorneys from posting
hate speech and suggests several possible formulations for this rule.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The introduction of the internet and its prolific use has had a tremendous
impact on the world. Work has become more efficient, information has
become more accessible, and people gather remotely to exchange ideas. All
of this is attributable in some part to the copious use of the internet in the
modern world.
One obvious feature of the internet is the ability to communicate with
others. Forums, blogs, message boards, and chat rooms are now part of
internet users’ daily lives. The ability to communicate via these online
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features enables users to express themselves, provide opinions, and interact
in cyber communities.
There are apparent positive aspects because the internet enables people to
instantaneously connect with others. For example, individuals who may be
suffering from depression can seek help in a community that empathizes
with and guides them to seek help. An academic can collaborate with a
colleague a thousand miles away on a project instantaneously. Or, citizens
of a country can come together and have a large-scale town hall debate on
important political issues.
In these circumstances, with the good comes the bad. Communication,
which perhaps is the cornerstone of the internet, is akin to speech. With
speech, there is always the possibility an individual may use it to
discriminate, harass, intimidate, or otherwise use it in an abusive manner
towards others. Thus, while the internet facilitates increased
communication, it may also facilitate increased discrimination, harassment,
and other abuse.
There has been a great deal of debate over how to remedy this problem
because unregulated internet speech has had damaging results on
individuals’ lives. National headlines have been created because of the ease
with which negative pictures and thoughts can be conveyed instantly to a
large-scale audience. However, regulating speech on the internet in the
United States is not a simple task because free speech is a fundamental right
indoctrinated in the US Constitution in its very First Amendment.
This article will analyze whether legal professionals can be disciplined
for making discriminatory and misogynistic remarks online, or whether
disciplining an attorney for this conduct would run afoul of the First
Amendment. The first section of this article will provide some examples of
attorney conduct online that should trigger discipline. The second section
will provide a background of the First Amendment, protected versus
unprotected speech, and when protected speech may still be regulated. The
third section will explain why the United States has a growing hate speech
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problem online due to its First Amendment protections and will argue that
attorneys should not be permitted to contribute to this problem.
The fourth section of the article will lay out examples of when attorneys’
First Amendment rights have been held to be permissibly regulated, as well
as a history of a prior proposal to modify the ABA Model Rules to prohibit
attorneys from engaging in discriminatory conduct. The final section of the
article will provide several options for language to be adopted in the Model
Rules to prohibit this conduct and will conclude by selecting and explaining
the best option.
II. ONLINE LEGAL COMMUNITIES AND FORUMS
Attorneys use the internet. There are countless blogs, websites, listservs,
and forums that attorneys participate in frequently. And, the percentage of
attorneys who use the internet socially continues to grow. In 2010, the
ABA’s Legal Technology Survey indicated that 56 percent of attorneys
responding to it participated in an online community or social network. 1
According to the 2013 survey, 81 percent of responding lawyers indicated
they use social networks.2 In all likelihood, this percentage will continue to
grow as time progresses.
Unfortunately, there have been numerous occasions where attorneys and
even judges have utilized these online outlets with the intent to specifically
harm one another, make unprofessional remarks, and engage in
discriminatory and sexist statements. 3 Most likely, this is because the
internet provides the illusion that they have made these statements
anonymously. These individuals would assuredly not publish these
comments with their names attached. But, with the impression of

1

J. Randolph Evans & Shari Klevens, Law, Ethics and the Internet: Applying Ethical
Rules to Social Media is, of Necessity, Already Underway, DAILY REPORT (Aug. 13,
2013).
2
Id.
3
See infra notes 8, 15, 23, and 29.
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anonymity, disparaging remarks are freely let loose without much
forethought by users.4
Numerous examples exist of these types of situations occurring within
the legal community. For instance, AutoAdmit.com holds itself out as “the
most prestigious” law forum on the internet, but racist and misogynistic
statements are germane in its threads. 5 Allegedly, the website’s primary
purpose is to disseminate information about law schools and law firms.6
However, law professor Brian Leiter once remarked on his blog that
AutoAdmit in fact is just “a massive forum for bizarre racist, anti-Semitic,
and viciously sexist postings, mixed in with posts genuinely related to law
school.”7
The website gained notoriety when a defamation lawsuit was filed
against 28 “John Does” who used the website and made statements about
two separate females. 8 Brittan Heller, a Yale Law School student at the
time, and Heide Iravani, a Phi Beta Kappa graduate from the University of
North Carolina, initiated this lawsuit against the anonymous AutoAdmit

4

See John Suler, The Online Disinhibition Effect, 7 CYBER-PSYCHOLOGY & BEHAVIOR
321, 321–26 (2004).
5
See The Most Prestigious Law School Discussion Board in the World, AUTOADMIT,
http://www.autoadmit.com (“The most prestigious law school discussion board in the
world”) (last visited Aug. 9, 2014); see also, LORI ANDREWS, SOCIAL NETWORKS AND
THE DEATH OF PRIVACY: I KNOW WHO YOU ARE AND I SAW WHAT YOU DID 103
(2011) (The term “AutoAdmit” is derived from a law school applicants’ high metrics
consisting of LSAT and GPA, which thereby guarantees that they will be admitted to a
top law school).
6
Id.
7
Brian Leiter, Penn Law Student, Anthony Ciolli, Admits to Running Prelaw Discussion
Board Awash in Racist, Anti-Semitic, Sexist Abuse, LEITER REPORTS (Mar. 11, 2005),
http://leiterreports.typepad.com/blog/2005/03/penn_law_studen.html.
8
ANDREWS, supra note 5, at 103 (noting AutoAdmit had an inordinate amount of
threads with racist and sexist words within them: “In 2005, only 150 threads discussed
UCLA, just over 100 were about ‘clerkships,’ and around 100 were about ‘Georgetown.’
In contrast AutoAdmit contained about 250 threads with the word ‘nigger,’ 300 threads
with the word ‘bitches,’ almost 300 threads with the word ‘cunt,’ 350 threads about Jews
(the majority derogatory), and over 200 threads about ‘fags[.]’”).
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users due to numerous disturbing derogatory messages posted on the
website pertaining to them specifically.9
For instance, when referring to Ms. Heller, one user posted, “I’ll force
myself on [Ms. Heller], most definitely,” and “I think I will sodomize her.
Repeatedly.”10 Another user stated that she had herpes.11 In regards to Ms.
Iravani, the AutoAdmit posters repeatedly made comments stating that she
was impregnated after her father raped her.12 And, another user created a
moniker of the University of North Carolina law school dean at the time and
posted that Ms. Iravani had sex with him for a passing grade in her Civil
Procedure class.13
While it cannot be proven these individuals were licensed attorneys, in all
likelihood, attorneys do engage in similar conduct on AutoAdmit. One of
the administrators of the website once disclosed that the posters in a single
thread were cumulatively linked to “virtually every firm in the Vault Top
50”—which are arguably considered the most prestigious law firms in the
United States. 14 Consequently, it is very likely that many attorneys do
indeed participate on this forum.
Recently, another public debate emerged on whether attorneys should
face state bar sanctions as a result of pseudo-anonymous racist comments.15
One poster using the moniker “dybbuk” made several sexist and harassing
comments about a University of Denver law professor named Nancy
9

Id.
Id. at 102.
11
Id.
12
Id. at 103.
13
Id.
14
Posting of Great Teacher Onizuka (Nov. 29, 2006, 6:30 PM), http://www.xoxohth.
com/thread.php?thread_id=535893&mc=164&forum_id=2#7096421 (“Speaking of IPs,
it seems like virtually every firm in the Vault Top 50 is represented in the IP logs for this
thread right now”).
15
Debra Cassens Weiss, Blogging law prof requests ethics probe of ‘dybbuk’
commenter, ABA JOURNAL, (Jan. 7, 2014), available at http://www.abajournal.com/
news/article/blogging_law_prof_files_ethics_complaint_against_pd_after_concluding_he
_was/.
10
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Leong.16 Ms. Leong identified at least seventy times “dybbuk” posted about
her on five different websites.17 As part of these comments, “dybbuk” wrote
two long plays that included Ms. Leong using drugs and made overly sexual
remarks about her.18 Ms. Leong was able to identify who ‘dybbuk’ was by
reading his previous posts that included enough information when linked
together to uncover his identity.19 Allegedly this individual is a male federal
public defender in Illinois. 20 After unmasking ‘dybbuk,’ Ms. Leong
subsequently filed an ethical complaint with the Illinois Attorney
Registration and Disciplinary Commission (ARDC) as a result of his
postings.21 In her complaint to the Illinois ARDC, she stated that “dybbuk’s
‘sexualized comments about [her] appearance and other disparaging
remarks made [her] concerned for [her] safety.’”22
In another extreme example, Paul Caston, a Mississippi lawyer, was
linked with the anonymous online identity “GENERAL_LEE” on the AntiSemitic Vanguard News Network website.23 Mr. Caston has posted on this
website over 3,500 times over the course of a decade. 24 While on this
website, he opined on his beliefs that African-Americans were objects,
animals, or things.25
Attorneys are not the only individuals in the legal community who have
been placed in the crosshairs as a result of their anonymous postings on
forums—judges too have drawn national attention for their internet
16

Id.
Id.
18
Id.
19
Id.
20
Id.
21
Id.
22
Id.
23
Ryan Lenz, Hatewatch Investigation: Mississippi Lawyer Tied to Online Racist
Screeds, SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER (Sept. 20, 2013, 8:15 AM), http://www.spl
center.org/blog/2013/09/20/hatewatch-investigation-mississippi-lawyer-tied-to-onlineracist-screeds/.
24
Id.
25
Id.
17
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comments. But, judges, unlike attorneys, are provided less free speech
protection as a result of swearing to abide by the Code of Judicial Ethics.26
For instance, ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct Rule 3.1 broadly
prohibits judges from engaging in extrajudicial activities that “would appear
to a reasonable person to undermine the judge’s independence, integrity, or
impartiality.” 27 Further, ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct Rule 3.6
prohibits judges from any affiliation with organizations that practice
invidious discrimination.28
On March 3, 2014, an Arkansas Circuit Court judge withdrew from a
race for a seat on the Arkansas Court of Appeals as a result of his sexist and
discriminatory forum comments being unmasked.29 Judge Mike Maggio for
several years posted on tigerdroppings.com, a Louisiana State University
sports fan website, under the name of “beauxjudge.”30 While on the website,
he openly disclosed, via postings, that he was indeed a judge.31
A portion of Judge Maggio’s comments on the website were sexist. For
example, Judge Maggio posted, “[w]omen look at 2 bulges on a man, one in
the front of the pants or second one in the back pocket. Whichever one is
bigger they can do without the other.” 32 In another post, Judge Maggio
made remarks about Charlize Theron’s adoption of an African American
baby that could be perceived as racist. 33 On yet another occasion, he
commented that you don’t see many doctors with names that appear to be
associated with African Americans.34 After his identity was revealed, Judge
26

ABA MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT CANON 3B(5) (2013) (prohibiting a judge
from bias or prejudice predicated upon discrimination).
27
ABA MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 3.1 (2012).
28
ABA MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 3.6 (2012).
29
Joe Patrice, Judge Caught Making Racist, Sexist Comments On Internet Board,
ABOVE THE LAW (March 4, 2014, 11:47 AM), http://abovethelaw.com/2014/03/judgecaught-making-racist-sexist-comments-on-Internet-board/.
30
Id.
31
Id.
32
Id.
33
Id.
34
Id.
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Maggio attempted to prevent further discovery of his comments and began
deleting them from the website. 35 The Judicial Discipline and Disability
Board acknowledged that it was investigating whether Judge Maggio indeed
was the poster of these comments, and whether he was in violation of any
ethical rules.36
This type of conduct by actors in the legal community draws up the
question of whether it should be permissible. The potential negative impacts
of this speech by these individuals substantially outweigh the positives.
However, as the next section of this Article will explain in detail, the First
Amendment protects discriminatory and misogynistic speech, and therefore
it is difficult to regulate this conduct in most circumstances.
III. FIRST AMENDMENT BACKGROUND
One may wonder why there are not more measures in place to prevent
discriminatory and misogynistic speech. However, it is important to
understand that the First Amendment provides citizens the fundamental
right of free speech. Under the First Amendment, before hate speech can be
restricted, a two-step analysis must be conducted. First, a court must
determine whether hate speech falls within a category of speech the
Supreme Court has deemed unprotected. Second, if hate speech does not
fall within such a category, then there must be consideration of whether hate
speech can be regulated pursuant to the standard free speech analysis.
The First Amendment is one of the most well-known and discussed
fundamental constitutional rights, and it provides US citizens the freedom
of speech. Specifically, the First Amendment states that
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people

35
36

Id.
Id.
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peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a
redress of grievances.37
Because of the First Amendment, individuals are able to freely practice
their religion, participate in groups, criticize the government in distributed
publications, and speak publicly or anonymously.38
One of the principle reasons the First Amendment was incorporated in
the Bill of Rights was the governmental suppression of speech and press
that existed in English society. 39 While the constitutional framers’ intent
when drafting this fundamental right has been bogged down in modernity
from a quagmire of theories, ironically, one argument for the protection is
to promote tolerance.40 Underlying this argument is the ideology that ideas
and theories should not be stifled by the government simply because they
are not backed by the majority of a nation.
This theory is reflected in the Supreme Court’s current test for
determining whether the government is suppressing speech. In Abrams v.
United States, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes penned a famous dissent
arguing that the First Amendment should foster a country with a “free trade
in ideas[.]”41 While this principle was first uttered in Holmes’s dissent, it
has been adopted as a credible rationale in subsequent First Amendment
precedent. The Supreme Court has often held that the government cannot
regulate speech based simply upon content, or when a particular view point
is silenced.42
37

U.S. CONST. amend. I.
The Supreme Court’s position on public criticism of the government has vacillated
throughout the years. See Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 65 (1960) (holding that a ban
on anonymous handbills was unconstitutional).
39
See generally, ZECHARIAH CHAFFEE, JR., FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES
(1941).
40
See generally, LEE BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND
EXTREMIST SPEECH IN AMERICA (1986).
41
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919).
42
See Police Dept. of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95–96 (1972) (“[A]bove all else, the
First Amendment means that government has no power to restrict expression because of
its message, its ideas, its subject matter or its content”); see also, R.A.V. v. City of St.
38
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In a 1992 Supreme Court decision, Justice Kennedy explicitly explained,
[g]overnment action that stifles speech on account of its message,
or that requires the utterance of a particular message favored by the
Government, contravenes this essential right . . . . For these
reasons, the First Amendment, subject only to narrow and wellunderstood exceptions, does not countenance governmental control
over the content of messages expressed by private individuals.43
Accordingly, when courts review a governmentally content-based or viewpoint-based regulation, they must apply the strict scrutiny test.44 In order for
a content-based or view-point-based discriminatory regulation to be
constitutional, the government must show that the regulation (1) furthers a
compelling state interest, and (2) the regulation is narrowly tailored to
achieve that end.45 The strict scrutiny test is a very difficult burden for the
government to satisfy and generally when it is triggered the regulation will
be struck down as unconstitutional.
While the plain language of the First Amendment appears in nature to be
absolute, the Supreme Court has never supported an absolutist position. The
Court has expressly “reject[ed] the view that freedom of speech and
association . . . as protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments, are
‘absolutes.’”46 In fact, virtually only one Justice has ever taken the position

Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 380, 382 (1992) (“[c]ontent-based regulations are presumptively
invalid”).
43
Turner Broadcasting Sys. v. F. Communication Comm., 512 U.S. 622, 641 (1994).
44
See, Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 334 (1988).
45
See Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983) (“For
the State to enforce content-based exclusion it must show that its regulation is necessary
to serve a compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn to achieve that end”).
46
Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 366 U.S. 36, 49 (1961).
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the First Amendment is absolute.47 Not surprisingly, it was Justice Black—
an absolutist.48
Furthermore, the Court has never departed from its reasoning that speech
uttered for the purpose of criminal conduct or to incite immediate violence
and chaos is not protected by the First Amendment.49 In Brandenberg v.
Ohio, the Court defined when the government could punish speech made
with the purpose of inciting illegal behavior.50 In Brandenburg, a Ku Klux
Klan leader was convicted because of an Ohio law prohibiting criminal
syndicalism.51 This leader was arrested for incitement of violence due to a
film of him at a Ku Klux Klan rally—which included his racist and antiSemitic speech along with a display of a number of firearms. 52 This
landmark Supreme Court opinion, which overruled several other prior
opinions, created a stringent test for incitement.53 For speech that incites
illegal behavior to be unprotected, three elements must be found: (1) an
imminent harm; (2) a likelihood of producing illegal action; and (3) an
intent to cause imminent illegality.54

47
See Hugo Black, The Bill of Rights, 35 N.Y.U. 865, 874, 879 (1960) (“The phrase
‘Congress shall make no law’ is composed of plain words, easily understood. . . . The
language is absolute[.]”); see also, Konigsberg, 366 U.S. at 56 (Black dissenting joined
by Douglass) (here Justice Douglass also adopted the absolutist position).
48
Konigsberg, 366 U.S. at 56.
49
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 445–49 (1969). See also W. Bradley Wendel,
Free Speech for Lawyers, 28 HASTINGS CON. L. Q. 305 (citing R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 380)
(conceding that burning cross in back yard of African-American family can be prosecuted
as a terroristic threat or damage to property); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 406–07
(1989) (suggesting that flag burning could be prosecuted under a statute prohibiting
outdoor fires); Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978) (“First
Amendment does not preclude regulation of commercial conduct”); Brandenburg, 395
U.S. at 456 (Douglas, J. concurring) (“‘The Line between what is permissible and not
subject to control and what may be made subject to regulation is the line between ideas
and overt acts’”).
50
See Brandenburg, 385 U.S. at 457–58.
51
Id.
52
Id.
53
Id.
54
Id.
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Additionally, the First Amendment offers no protection for speech that
constitutes a “‘true’ threat.”55 Brandenberg is intrinsically related to the true
threat test, as it involves speech promoting violence. In 2003, the Supreme
Court in Virginia v. Black explained what constitutes a true threat.56 Justice
O’Connor stated in her plurality opinion that true threats are
those statements where the speaker means to communicate a
serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful
violence to a particular individual or group of individuals . . . [the
speaker] need not actually intend to carry out the threat. Rather, a
prohibition on true threats protects individuals from the fear of
violence and from the disruption that fear engenders, in addition to
protecting people from the possibility that the threatened violence
will occur.57
Further, she indicated intimidation is “a type of true threat, where a speaker
directs a threat to a person or group of persons with the intent of placing the
victim in fear of bodily harm or death.”58
Another type of unprotected speech is “fighting words.”59 The Supreme
Court in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire expressly held that speech that
constitutes “fighting words” was unprotected by the First Amendment.60 In
Chaplinsky, the Court recognized two separate instances where speech
could be considered “fighting words”: (1) when the speech was likely to
cause a violent response against the speaker, and (2) when the insulting
speech would likely inflict immediate emotional harm.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has held that the First Amendment does
not protect people from common law tort actions as a result of their speech.
55

See Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969); see also Madsen v. Women’s
Health Ctr., 512 U.S. 753, 773 (1994) (holding that threats to individuals are not
protected under the First Amendment, but speech that may cause distress or be
disagreeable to individuals is protected).
56
See generally Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003).
57
Id. at 359–60 (internal citations omitted).
58
Id. at 360.
59
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571–72 (1942).
60
Id.
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For instance, the First Amendment does not protect an individual from
liability if they make defamatory remarks about another person.61 However,
the statements made must be false and non-opinionated, and must not fall
within one of the First Amendment exceptions—for example, certain
statements about a public figure.62
A. Hate Speech and the First Amendment
Defining hate speech is a difficult task. Perhaps the simplest definition of
hate speech is discriminatory and derogatory statements or symbolic actions
that target a specific group. Examples of hate speech are: racial slurs,
overtly sexist comments, and physical actions such as burning crosses in the
front yards of African Americans or spray-painting swastikas on a Jewish
family’s residences.
Currently, hate speech is protected under the First amendment.63 In order
for hate speech to be unprotected, it must fall within one of the First
Amendment exceptions. Traditionally, the most successful arguments that
speech is not protected by the First Amendment are the “true threat”
doctrine, or the Chaplinsky “fighting words” exception in regulating speech
that may be considered “hate speech.”64
There has been scholarly debate over whether hate speech should be
considered protected speech under the First Amendment.65 Perhaps the most
compelling argument for the permissibility of regulating racist and sexist
speech is that hate speech should be considered akin to unprotected conduct
61

See N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
Id.
63
See Brandenburg, 395 U.S. 116 (1966); R.A.V., 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
64
See Brandenburg, 395 U.S. 116 (1966); see also, Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 571–72
(1942) (Fighting words are “no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such
slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is
clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality”).
65
See generally, e.g., Charles R. Lawrence, III, If He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating
Racist Speech on Campus, 1990 DUKE L.J. 431 (1990); David Kretzmer, Freedom of
Speech and Racism, 8 CARDOZO L. REV. 445 (1987); Mari Matsuda, Public Response to
Racist Speech: Considering the Victim’s Story, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2320 (1989).
62
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(i.e., tort action) in that it conflicts with the constitutional value of
equality. 66 However, this type of argument has yet to make any traction
within the court system.
Public college campuses, bastions for diverse and divergent thoughts, are
participants in this debate because they construct codes prohibiting hate
speech. 67 In the past, when these codes are challenged for their
constitutionality, the colleges and universities argue the codes are
constitutional because they are within the “fighting words” constitutional
exception category. 68 But, this more than likely has changed after the
Supreme Court’s decision in R.A.V. v. City of Saint Paul.69 In that case, the
Supreme Court was presented with the issue of whether the City’s speech
ordinance was constitutional under the “fighting words” exception.70 The
ordinance criminalized the
plac[ing] on public or private property a symbol . . . including but
not limited to, a burning cross or Nazi swastika, which one knows
or has reason to know arouses anger, alarm or resentment in others
on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender.71
Ultimately, in R.A.V., the Supreme Court determined that the ordinance
was narrowed only to prevent fighting words in limited circumstances (the
protection of targeted minority groups) and therefore it was
unconstitutional.72 Notably, in its opinion the Court stated that the City of
Saint Paul could prohibit cross burning if the statute was drafted in a
manner consistent with the First Amendment.73 This would entail drafting a

66
See Richard Delgado, Words that Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults, Epithets,
and Name-Calling, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 133, 180 (1982).
67
See generally Lawrence, supra note 65.
68
Id.
69
See generally R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
70
Id.
71
Id. at 380.
72
Id. at 394.
73
Id. at 396 (“St. Paul has sufficient means at its disposal to prevent such behavior
without adding the First Amendment to the fire”).
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statute that prohibits this conduct generally, as opposed to isolating and
protecting only minority groups.
As aforementioned in the previous sections in this article, attorneys make
statements on the internet that are categorized as hate speech. While hate
speech is generally permissible pursuant to First Amendment protection, a
question arises as to whether speech should be permissible if it is harmful.
The next section of this article explains what problems arise from hate
speech on the internet and why hate speech is particularly harmful to
professional groups, such as attorneys.
IV. PROBLEMS ARISING IN THE UNITED STATES BECAUSE OF EXISTING
INTERNET HATE SPEECH LEGAL FRAMEWORK
In contrast to many other countries, the United States provides hate
speech a constitutional protection.74 After World War II, many European
countries passed laws and signed international agreements prohibiting hate
speech.75 For example, the International Convention on the Elimination of
All Forms of Racial Discrimination explicitly provides in Article 4 that
parties
(a) Shall declare an offence punishable by law all dissemination of
ideas based on racial superiority or hatred, incitement to racial
discrimination, as well as all acts of violence or incitement to such
acts against any race or group of persons of another colour or
ethnic origin, and also the provision of any assistance to racist
activities, including the financing thereof; (b) Shall declare illegal
and prohibit organizations, and also organized and all other
propaganda activities, which promote and incite racial
discrimination, and shall recognize participation in such
organizations or activities as an offence punishable by law; (c)

74

See Louis Henkin, Group Defamation and International Law, in GROUP DEFAMATION
123 (Monroe Freedman & Eric Freedman, eds., 1995).
75
Christopher Van Blarcum, Internet Hate Speech: The European Framework and the
Emerging American Haven, 62 WASH. & LEE 781, 785–86 (2005).
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Shall not permit public authorities or public institutions, national or
local, to promote or incite racial discrimination.76
Over 150 nations signed the Convention, including the majority of the
members of the Council of Europe.77 Interestingly, the United States also
ratified the Convention; however, it did so with the reservation that it would
refuse to undertake any measures that would violate its First Amendment.78
Hate speech falls within the category of protected speech of the First
Amendment. 79 Laws cannot be promulgated restricting it if they are
restricting one view point as opposed to another.80 Furthermore, anonymous
speech over the internet is also provided the highest degree of First
Amendment protection.81 Because of the United States’ current protection
of internet hate speech, hate speech dedicated websites and forums run
rampant online. The Southern Poverty Law Center in 1998 determined that
163 hate sites existed on the internet.82 In 2005, this number exploded to
524.83 These numbers are only indicative of websites that are dedicated to
discrimination. It does not take into account individual discriminatory
comments that are as freely posted as blog comments or forum postings.
This has simply become a problem. Individuals are harmed as a result of
hate speech online. And, it is even arguably chilling another individual’s

76

International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,
660 U.N.T.S. 195 (1966).
77
See Blarcum, supra note 75, at 786.
78
Id.
79
See supra note 64.
80
See, e.g., Perry Educ. Ass’n., 460 U.S. at 45.
81
Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 849 (1997).
82
Number of Hate Sites Increase Online: Hate groups find a home on the Net,
SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER (1998), available at http://www.splcenter.org/getinformed/intelligence-report/browse-all-issues/1998/winter/163-and-counting (last visited
Aug. 23, 2014).
83
Mark Potok, Hate Groups Increase Numbers, Unite Against Immigrants, SOUTHERN
POVERTY LAW CENTER (2006), available at http://www.splcenter.org/getinformed/intelligence-report/browse-all-issues/2006/spring/the-year-in-hate-2005 (last
visited Aug. 23, 2014).

VOLUME 13 • ISSUE 1 • 2014

81

82

SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE

speech if specifically directed at a targeted individual.84 For example, in
2007, a former Technorati Top 100 blog on the subject of how to design
user-friendly software was shut down as a result of repeated cyber
harassment directed at the creator.85 Kathy Sierra, the blogger who hosted
this site, continuously received threats and explicit sexual posts directed
towards her on the site, which inevitably led her to fear for her safety and
negatively affected her mental health.86 At one point, Ms. Sierra was even
afraid of going into her backyard.87 Commenters demeaned her by posting
her photograph next to a noose and, doctoring a photo to show her face
muzzling red lace panties.88 Moreover, one commenter actually posted her
home address and social security number.89
Should this be allowed to occur? Current First Amendment legal
precedent generally permits cyber-harassment of this sort. 90 This should
change. But, in the meantime, in circumstances similar to “dybbuk” and
Professor Leong, when an attorney is the commenter, can state bar
associations prohibit this conduct? In examining this question, it is
important to consider two questions: (1) whether an individual who engages
in this conduct is fit to practice law; and (2) whether this conduct is
detrimental to the image of the profession.

84

ANDREWS, supra note 5, at 102.
Id. (citing Alex Pham, Cyber-bullies’ Abuse, Threats Hurl Fear into the Blogosphere,
LOS ANGELES TIMES, March 31, 2007, at C1, available at
http://articles.latimes.com/2007/mar/31/business/fi-Internet31).
86
Id. (citing Pham, supra note 85).
87
Id.
88
Id.
89
Id. (citing Dylan Tweney, Kathy Sierra Case: Few Clues, Little Evidence, Much
Controversy, WIRED (April 16, 2007), available at
www.wired.com/techbiz/people/news/2007/04/kathysierra); Cathy Seipp & Kathy Sierra,
Wild in the Blog-o-shphere,” FISHBOWL LA BLOG (March 27, 2007),
www.mediabistro.com/fishbowlla/cathy-seipp-and-kathy-sierra-wild-in-the-blog-osphere_b3903.
90
There has been considerable debate in several states and Congress in adopting statutes
which will criminalize certain conduct which can be defined as cyber-harassment.
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V. ATTORNEYS’ FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS
As any other citizen of the United States, an attorney is provided the
same rights under the Constitution—including the First Amendment.
Therefore, attorneys’ speech is protected and cannot be restricted unless
certain conditions apply. Regulating attorneys’ discriminatory or harassing
remarks online, or elsewhere, similar to remarks by other citizens, is
difficult under the existing First Amendment precedent. But, attorneys’
speech has been limited, despite their First Amendment rights, in manners
that differ from limitations on speech by the general public in some
circumstances. For instance, attorneys can be sanctioned for making
disparaging remarks about the judiciary and have additional restrictions
imposed on them for commercial speech. 91 Thus, a proposed measure
restricting attorneys from engaging in hate speech, regardless of the First
Amendment, may still be constitutional.
A. Limitations on Attorneys’ Free Speech
The nature of attorneys’ profession requires more restrictions on their
speech in contrast to the general public. Ethical rules adopted by states that
otherwise would be considered unconstitutional are still upheld as
constitutional in the context of attorneys if they “are justified by a state’s
interest in preserving public confidence in the judiciary and ensuring fair
and impartial adjudications.”92 Justice Cardozo acknowledged this principle
in In re Rouss, by stating that membership to the bar is a privilege burdened
with conditions. 93 In that case, an attorney elected to use his Fifth
Amendment right by refusing to testify on an issue that would be self-
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See infra notes 96, 99, & 103.
Terri R. Day, Speak No Evil: Legal Ethics v. The First Amendment, 32 J. LEGAL PROF.
161, 169 (2008).
93
In re Rouss, 116 N.E. 782, 783 (1917).
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incriminating, and later was disciplined for asserting this constitutional right
by his state bar.94
In re Rouss is just one example of courts recognizing that an attorney can
be disciplined by their respective state bar association for otherwise
constitutionally protected speech. 95 State bar associations follow this
principal when limiting attorneys’ otherwise fundamental rights in
circumstances where a compelling interest exists to maintain the integrity of
the profession. The following subsections of this article provide explicit
rules and examples of restrictions on attorneys’ First Amendment rights.
1. Speech Critical of the Judiciary—Model Rule 8.2
The ABA adopted a model rule prohibiting attorneys from making false
statements and negative comments against the judiciary.96
Pursuant to Model Rule 8.2,
(a) [a] lawyer shall not make a statement that the lawyer knows to
be false or with reckless disregard as to its truth or falsity
concerning the qualifications or integrity of a judge, adjudicatory
officer or public legal officer, or a candidate for election or
appointment to judicial or legal office.
Comment 1 of Model Rule 8.2 provides that an attorney may not speak or
act in a manner that will “unfairly undermine public confidence in the
administration of justice.”97 In fact, many states will even sanction attorneys
for statements pertaining to judges that constitute mere opinion—i.e.,
attorneys’ opinions about the intelligence of a judge or a judge’s character.98

94

Id.
Id. (Holding that the New York State Bar Association’s disbarment of an attorney who
did not provide testimony against himself was permissible).
96
See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.2 (2013).
97
Id.
98
See Margaret C. Tarkington, The Truth Be Damned: The First Amendment, Attorney
Speech, and Judicial Reputation, 97 GEO. L.J. 1567, 1569 (2009); see contra, Standing
Comm. on Discipline v. Yagman, 55 F.3d 1430 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that an attorney
95
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Furthermore, the forum in which the statement was made is irrelevant in
determining whether an attorney has violated the rule.99
Rule 8.2 extends to statements that have been made orally in private
conversation or in public.100 Logically, the rule has been extended to the
virtual world to cases in which attorneys criticize judges on the internet. For
instance, a Florida attorney was disciplined after describing a judge on her
blog as an “‘evil, unfair witch’ with an ‘ugly condescending attitude.’”101
As a result of this comment, the Florida Bar reprimanded the attorney and
required her to pay $1,250.102
One of the principle reasons that the ABA adopted Rule 8.2 was to
protect the public’s perception of judicial integrity from being impugned.103
In a United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit opinion, Chief
Judge Easterbrook held that attorneys simply do not receive the same First
Amendment rights in regard to political debate as ordinary citizens.104 With
this stance, the Seventh Circuit upheld the disbarment of an attorney in
federal courts due to his statements about judges’ character.105 The attorney
in this case was disbarred by the State of Illinois for making baseless
accusations that judges had committed criminal acts and other wrongs.106
However, there have been many criticisms of this rationale because the
judiciary essentially has entrenched itself from intra-professional criticism;
even in instances of potential judicial abuse, attorneys are restrained from
making public comments. 107 Irrespective of these criticisms, it is well
can only be punished for critical speech against the judiciary if it is shown that the speech
was made with actual malice).
99
See Tarkington, supra note 98, at 1621.
100
Id. at 1569–70.
101
Tresa Baldas, Lawyers Critical of Judges Fight For Rights, NAT’L L.J. (Feb. 9, 2009),
available at http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=1202428070373.
102
Id.
103
See Tarkington, supra note 98, at 1570.
104
In re Michael Palmisano, 70 F.3d 483 (7th Cir. 1995).
105
Id.
106
Id.
107
Tarkington, supra note 98, at 1601–02, 1609.
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established currently that attorneys can be prohibited by their state bar
associations from making negative comments against the judiciary.108
2. Advertising and Solicitation
Commercial speech has long been recognized as falling within the
category of protected speech. 109 Advertising and soliciting individuals to
use one’s services or product therefore are considered protected speech.
States have attempted to curtail attorneys’ advertising and solicitation of
new clients by promulgating state bar rules prohibiting certain types of
conduct.110 However, the Supreme Court has routinely held that attorneys
cannot be prohibited from engaging in truthful, non-deceptive advertising of
their services.111
In contrast, the Court has held that state ethical rules prohibiting
attorneys from in-person solicitation of clients for profit are acceptable.112
The Court held that the distinction between the two is that states possess a
“compelling interest in preventing those aspects of solicitation that involve
fraud, undue influence, intimidation, overreaching, and other forms of
vexatious conduct.” 113 It reasoned that in-person solicitation has the
inherent risk that an attorney will deceive and pressure a potential client, as
there is no way to monitor the attorney’s communication with that client.114
108

Id. at 1569–70, 1574.
See generally Virginia State Bd. Of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976) (holding a Virginia law prohibiting pharmacists from
advertising price of drugs unconstitutional). However, it should be noted that commercial
speech is provided a lesser degree of protection. See Central Hudson Gas v. Public Serv.
Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 563 (1980) (“[t]he Constitution therefore accords a lesser
protection to commercial speech than to other constitutionally guaranteed expression”).
110
See generally Kyle Perkins, Advertising: The Marketing of Legal Services in the
Twenty-First Century, 35 GONZ. L. REV. 99 (2000); Mitchel Winick, et. al, Attorney
Advertising on the Internet: From Arizona to Texas-Regulating Speech on the CyberFrontier, 27 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1489 (1996).
111
See generally Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
112
See generally Ohralik, 436 U.S. 447.
113
Id. at 462.
114
Id. at 465.
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These model rules have been applied to attorneys’ speech online as
well. 115 Internet communications are analogous to telephone
communications and in-person conversations due to the conveyance of
instantaneous messages. Consequently, some state bar associations have
prohibited attorneys from communicating with individuals by these means
under solicitation rules.116
3. Administration of Justice—Model Rules 3.5(a) and 3.6(a)
Attorney speech pertaining to pending cases is classified as protected.117
But, the Court has held that an attorney can constitutionally be sanctioned if
her or his remarks about pending cases will substantially prejudice an
adjudicatory proceeding.118 Underlying this rationale is the principle that as
licensed officers of the court, attorneys have a duty to aid in the fair
administration of justice. 119 Based upon this rationale, it is clear that an
attorney’s speech about proceedings or about a judge in a detrimental
manner could have a negative impact on the fair administration of justice.
Courts have held that attorneys’ speech in this context is permissibly chilled
in some circumstances.120
This principle is memorialized in Model Rule 3.5(a). 121 Model Rule
3.5(a) prevents lawyers from communicating with judges, jurors, or
115

See THE FLORIDA BAR STANDING COMMITTEE ON ADVERTISING, Guidelines for
Networking Sites, FLORIDA BAR (Apr. 16, 2013), available at http://www.floridabar.org/
TFB/TFBResources.nsf/Attachments/18BC39758BB54A5985257B590063EDA8/$FILE/
Guidelines%20-%20Social%20Networking%20Sites.pdf?OpenElement (“Invitations sent
directly from a social media site via instant messaging to a third party to view or link to
the lawyer’s page on an unsolicited basis for the purpose of obtaining, or attempting to
obtain, legal business are solicitations in violation of Rule 4-7.18(a)[.]”).
116
Id.
117
Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 501 U.S. 1030 (1991).
118
Id. at 1034.
119
See Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966) (overturning a conviction because the
trial had a “carnival atmosphere” and the jury was exposed to publicity).
120
See Tarkington, supra note 98, at 1569 (indicating that an attorneys’ opinionated
speech about the judiciary can even be restricted).
121
See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.5(a) (2013).
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prospective jurors in a manner that would hinder a court’s impartiality.122
Additionally, Rule 3.6(a) prohibits attorneys from making statements to the
press that will likely prejudice trials.123
The Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of these rules after
Nevada adopted a similar provision.124 In Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, an
attorney argued that the “substantial likelihood” threshold currently in place
to determine whether an attorney’s speech is protected in regard to
adjudicatory proceedings was too burdensome and instead should be
replaced by a “clear and present danger” threshold.125 However, the Court
disagreed and held that “the substantial likelihood of material prejudice”
standard constitutes a constitutionally permissible balance between the First
Amendment rights of attorneys in pending cases and the State’s interest in
fair trials.”126
Rule 3.5(a) extends outside of attorneys’ personal involvement in the
representation of their clients, which illustrates that attorneys can be
disciplined outside the scope of their professional actions. For example, in
2009 the California Bar Disciplinary Commission sanctioned a San Diego
attorney who had posted information on his personal blog about a trial on
which he was serving as a juror. 127 In his postings, he included case
details. 128 As a result of these postings, the trial verdict was eventually

122

See id. (“A lawyer shall not: (a) seek to influence a judge, juror, prospective juror or
other official by means prohibited by law . . .”).
123
Id. R. 3.6(a) (“A lawyer who is participating or has participated in a matter shall not
make an extrajudicial statement that the lawyer knows or reasonably should know will be
disseminated by means of public communication and will have a substantial likelihood of
materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding in the matter”).
124
See generally Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1030.
125
See id.
126
Id. at 1074.
127
John Schwartz, A Legal Battle: Online Attitude vs. Rules of the Bar, THE NEW YORK
TIMES, Sept. 12, 2009, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/13/us/13lawyers.
html.
128
Id.
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vacated and the case was remanded to the lower court.129 Because he was an
attorney himself, the disciplinary committee suspended his license for 45
days, placed him on a two-year probation period upon reinstatement, and
ordered him to pay $14,000 in legal fees incurred by the parties in the
underlying case.130
4. Disclosure of Confidential Information—Model Rule 1.6
The relationship between an attorney and a client is unique. Necessary
privileges and fiduciary duties have been indoctrinated within the
profession in order for attorneys to effectively do their jobs. One of the
bedrock privileges in the profession, which is commonly known—but
frequently misunderstood—is the attorney-client confidentiality privilege.
This privilege has been memorialized in Model Rule 1.6, which states that
an attorney cannot disclose confidential information of a client without that
client’s informed consent (with limited exceptions).131 If attorneys violate
this rule, they will face ethical sanctions by their state disciplinary
commission. Consequently, here too, is another example of a limitation on
an attorney’s First Amendment rights due to the nature of the profession.
With the explosion of technology and the internet, Model Rule 1.6 has
been a hot topic recently. Confidential information is not kept under lock
and key as in the past with physical files. Law firms have become targets of
hackers for the valuable information that they keep—bank account
numbers, social security numbers, corporate trade secrets, etc. 132 Beyond
this, however, attorneys have also unbelievably taken to the internet
pseudo-anonymously and have disclosed confidential information about
their clients.
129

Id.
Id.
131
MODEL RULE OF PROF’L CONDUCT 1.6 (2013).
132
Jennifer Smith, Client Secrets at Risk as Hackers Target Law Firms, WALL STREET J.
(Jun. 25, 2012), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2012/06/25/dont-click-on-that-link-clientsecrets-at-risk-as-hackers-target-law-firms/.
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For example, from 2007 to 2008, Kristine Peshek, an Illinois assistant
public defender of 19 years lost her job for disclosing confidential
information on her blog about some of her clients. 133 In one post, Ms.
Peshek disclosed a client’s jail identification number and stated that he was
stupid for falling upon his sword for his brother on a controlled substance
possession charge because “he’s no snitch.”134 In another post, she wrote:
Dennis, the diabetic whose case I mentioned in Wednesday’s post,
did drop as ordered, after his court appearance Tuesday and before
allegedly going to the ER. Guess what? It was positive for cocaine.
He was standing there in court stoned, right in front of the judge,
probation officer, prosecutor and defense attorney swearing he was
clean and claiming ignorance as to why his blood sugar wasn’t
being managed well.135
As a result of these statements, the Illinois Attorney Disciplinary
Commission determined that the attorney’s conduct violated the ethical
rules of conduct as it was both prejudicial to the administration of justice
and an unauthorized disclosure of confidential information. She was
suspended for sixty days.136
5. Admission to a State Bar Association—The Case of Matthew F. Hale
In 1998, the Illinois State Bar Commission on Character and Fitness was
presented with an unusual situation. 137 Matthew Hale, a freshly minted
graduate from the University of Southern Illinois Law School passed the
Illinois bar examination. 138 It was now the Commission’s job to analyze
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In re Peshnek, M.R. 23794, 09 CH 89 (Ill. 2010).
In re Kristine Ann Peshek, Hearing Board of the Illinois Attorney Registration and
Disciplinary Commission (Aug. 25, 2009), https:www.iardc.org/09CH0089CM.html.
135
Id.
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In re Peshnek, M.R. 23794, 09 CH 89 (Ill. 2010).
137
Jason O. Billy, Confronting Racist at the Bar: Matthew Hale, Moral Character, and
Regulating the Marketplace of Ideas, 22 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 25, 25–26 (2006),
available at http://www3.law.harvard.edu/journals/hjrej-articles/archive/vol22/billy.pdf.
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Id.
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whether this individual possessed the moral integrity to be admitted in
Illinois to practice law.
While this is usually a routine decision the Commission faces,
occasionally it will come across individuals with violent felonies or a
pattern of dishonesty. Matthew Hale’s application was unique. He was an
outspoken leader of the Klu Klux Klan. 139 But, Hale informed the
Commission that he would follow laws in existence mandating equality.
Nevertheless, the Inquiry Panel for the Committee on Character and Fitness
was left with a tough question—whether in spite of his racist beliefs, Hale
possessed the “requisite character and fitness” to be admitted to the Illinois
Bar.
In a two to one decision, the Inquiry panel denied Hale admission to the
Illinois Bar as a result of his racist beliefs.140 However, the Inquiry Panel
did not make this decision lightly. It recognized that denying Hale
admission to the Bar based upon his hate speech and his association with a
fringe political group may raise First Amendment questions. The Inquiry
Panel reasoned that when balancing Hale’s interest with the State’s, their
decision would be upheld under existing First Amendment analysis
scrutiny.141 Principally, the Panel concluded that lawyers are dedicated to
preserving certain “fundamental truths,” and one such truth is racial
equality.142 As Matthew Hale’s outspoken beliefs were in sharp opposition
to this fundamental truth, the Panel determined that it would be
constitutional to reject his admission to the Bar to protect the State’s
interests in preserving the integrity of the bar and the laws of the State.143

139

Id.
In re Hale, Comm. of Character & Fitness (1st Dis. App. Ct. 1998), reprinted in
GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, ET. AL, THE LAW AND ETHICS OF LAWYERING 875 (3d ed.
1999).
141
See Billy, supra note 137, at 31.
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Wendel, supra note 49, at 316–17.
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Interestingly, groups in direct contrast to Hale’s ideology disagreed with
this decision.144 Notably, a large Jewish civil rights organization, the AntiDefamation League, disagreed with Hale’s denial. One regional Director of
the organization stated, “[w]e are repulsed by Matt Hale, but we respect the
principle of speech and believe he is entitled to the opportunity to spew his
venom without restriction.” 145 The concern with this decision was that
perhaps the tables would turn one day, and that radical minority groups
would be prohibited under the same rationale. 146 However, the Inquiry
Panel’s decision aligns with prior Supreme Court decisions where it has
upheld a states’ denials of bar membership as a result of the individuals’
affiliation with groups with ideologies that run afoul of existing
constitutional tenets.147
The Matthew Hale example draws an interesting parallel with a proposal
prohibiting attorneys from engaging in conduct that is considered to be
discrimination or sexually biased harassment. Throughout the profession’s
history, good moral character has been considered a requirement for the
practice of law. 148 The Supreme Court in Konigsberg v. State Bar of
California essentially held that state bar associations indeed could impose a
requirement of good moral character in evaluating whether applicants could
be admitted to the bar.149
If state bar associations can initially impose a requirement of good moral
character when considering whether individuals should be admitted to
practice in their respective jurisdictions, should they be able to discipline
attorneys who fall below this standard? The most comparable model rule to
144

See Billy, supra note 137, at 31.
Id.
146
See, e.g., Adrienne Drell, Jewish Group Protests Denial of Law License for AntiSemite, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Feb. 10, 1999, at 14; Elli Wohlgelernter, Spreading Hate on the
Net, JERUSALEM POST, Jul. 9, 1999, at 6B.
147
See generally Konigsberg, 366 U.S. 36; In re Anastaplo, 366 U.S. 82 (1961).
148
See Deborah L. Rhode, Moral Character as a Professional Credential, 94 YALE L.J.
491, 493 (1985).
149
See Billy, supra note 137, at 28.
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the requirement of possessing good moral character is Model Rule 8.4,
which was enacted to maintain the integrity of the profession. 150 Model
Rule 8.4 defines attorney misconduct.151 However, Model Rule 8.4 is not
promulgated to regulate all types of behavior by attorneys; instead, it limits
itself to defining what is considered “professional misconduct.” 152
Generally, when attorneys engage in misogynistic and racist speech on the
internet, they are exhibiting this behavior on their free time. Therefore, this
Model Rule would not apply because attorneys are engaging in conduct that
is outside the scope of their professional duties.
VI. THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION SHOULD MODIFY MODEL RULE 8.4
In order to reign in attorneys’ hate speech, the ABA should modify its
Model Rule 8.4 to explicitly state that attorneys are prohibited from
engaging in or manifesting intentional discriminatory comments to harass.
While this measure may seem drastic, and at odds with the First
Amendment, the model rule will be beneficial towards maintaining the
public’s general perception that the legal profession is indoctrinated with
the notion of civility. Furthermore, other similar efforts have been made in
prohibiting discriminatory conduct by lawyers.153
Such a model rule, if adopted by state bar associations, likely would be
constitutional despite the First Amendment due to the compelling interest of
the profession to protect its image. 154 In the case of Matthew Hale, the
Inquiry Panel analyzed that scenario under the lens of free-speech

150

See MODEL R. OF PROF’L CONDUCT 8.4 (2013). The subtitle of Model Rule 8.4 is
“Maintaining the Integrity of the Profession.”
151
Id.
152
See id.
153
E.g., Andrew Taslitz & Sharon Styles-Anderson, Still Officers of the Court: Why the
First Amendment is No Bar to Challenging Racism, Sexism and Ethnic Bias in the Legal
Profession, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 781, 783 (1996).
154
See In re Rouss, 116 N.E. at 783 (stating the practice of law is a privilege which in
turn comes with additional burdens).
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limitations in the context of government-run work places.155 Consequently,
when analyzing whether a limitation on speech is constitutional, the
government’s interest “must be paramount, one of vital importance, and the
burden is on the government to show the existence of such an interest.”156
However, Pickering v. Board of Education demonstrates that an
individual’s fundamental right of free speech must still be weighed with a
state’s compelling interests. 157 Applying this analysis to the proposed
change to Model Rule 8.4, state bar associations have a compelling interest
in maintaining the public’s perception of the integrity of the profession in
order to facilitate a system with the purpose of administering justice
neutrally.
Comments and statements made online by an individual in a profession
may damage the integrity of her or his professional group affiliation. For
example, Amanda Tatro, a mortuary-science student, posted updates on her
social network page about her cadaver, which she had named “Bernie.”158
In one such posting, Tatro stated she was, “looking forward to Monday’s
embalming therapy as well as a rumored opportunity to aspirate. Give me
room, lots of aggression to be taken out with a trocar.” 159 Eventually,
Tatro’s University became aware of these postings and her administrators
disciplined her by requiring her to take a clinical ethics class, requiring her
to undertake a psychiatric evaluation, and placing her on academic
probation. 160 Tatro challenged her university’s discipline on First
Amendment grounds.161 The court, however, disagreed because Tatro had
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undermined the public’s perception of a profession that is dependent upon
its trust.162
The Tatro case illustrates that courts can find that a professional
institution can restrict speech to maintain the public perception of the
profession—this falls within the category of a compelling interest. It is well
recognized that attorneys have a unique role in society and have the burden
of higher professional ethical standards.163 This burden simply comes with
the privilege of being an officer of the courts. This is an understanding
individuals appreciate at the time they apply for admission to the bar, and
when they are sworn in under oath before their respective state supreme
courts to practice law.
A. History of the Prior Proposal
In 1992, a report commissioned by the ABA in regard to whether there
was evidence of racial and ethnic bias in the justice system concluded such
bias does exist within the system.164 The report recommended that
[n]o lawyer should intentionally engage in racially or ethnically
discriminatory acts in the practice of his or her profession. The
Task Force recommends that the ABA consider amending its
Model Rules of Professional Conduct to make acts of racial and
ethnic discrimination while acting in one’s professional capacity
sanctionable and unprofessional conduct.165
After this report was issued at the 1994 midyear ABA meeting, a
recommendation was offered to modify Model Rule 8.4 to prohibit
attorneys’ discriminatory conduct by considering it as professional
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misconduct under the Rule. 166 Eventually the ABA Standing Committee
determined that it would be a mistake to incorporate such a broad, sweeping
prohibition in the Model Rules. 167 The Committee’s reasoning for this
determination rested on the constitutionality of prohibiting such speech due
to First Amendment protections. 168 The Committee believed that “a
disciplinary rule to control lawyer speech would undoubtedly run afoul of
the First Amendment.” 169 The next section of this Article explains why
revisitation of this issue is due.
B. Revisitation of this Issue Is Due
A new rule prohibiting attorneys from engaging in discriminatory and
misogynistic speech should be adopted. The proliferation of hate speech and
sexist remarks online is a growing and serious issue. Attorneys engage in
this conduct, which has sullied the professional image. The ramifications of
this type of speech published online for the whole world to view are real
and serious—people are injured, reputations are tarnished, and damages
occur.170
The best way of curtailing this behavior by attorneys is by defining it as
an act of professional misconduct pursuant to Model Rule 8.4. If this is
done, and states will subsequently adopt the suggested model rule, and
attorneys will likely be deterred from engaging in this conduct online.
Currently, the reach of the ABA’s Model Rule 8.4 is very narrow in regard
to what is considered professional “misconduct.” Of note, however, the rule
does not limit itself to attorneys’ conduct wholly within the scope of their
professional duties. Professional misconduct for attorneys includes
166
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behaving in a dishonest manner and engaging in any conduct that is
prejudicial to the administration of justice.171
The intent of Model Rule 8.4 is depicted in its comments. The Model
Rule is drafted in order to discipline attorneys who engage in conduct that
reflects adversely on their fitness to practice law.172 Comment 3 of Model
Rule 8.4 considers it professional misconduct for an attorney to engage in
conduct that evidences a bias or prejudice based upon an individual’s “race,
sex, religion, national origin, disability, age, sexual orientation or
socioeconomic status.”173 However, Model Rule 8.4 is only applicable to an
attorney’s conduct within their professional scope. When the previously
modified model rule was suggested in the 1994 mid-year meeting, the
Committee was operating under a false presumption that it would be unable
to constitutionally draft such a rule.174 This is untrue. Attorneys can have
their First Amendment rights limited in some circumstances as admission to
practice is a privilege—those who want to exercise their full First
Amendment rights may give up the privilege of practicing law.
This is evidenced by the present constitutionality of Model Rule 8.4 (the
prohibition of adverse remarks about the judiciary) despite the Rule’s clear
content and view-point discrimination. 175 Moreover, the Hale scenario
raises an interesting parallel with the issues presented here—discriminatory
remarks as a basis for discipline.
Similar to the Illinois Inquiry Panel’s reasoning, state bar disciplinary
commissions should be able to discipline individuals who make racist and
sexist comments. State bar associations and their respective state supreme
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courts have a compelling interest in maintaining the public image of a
profession that is linked with integrity and upholding the law. 176 Public
racist and sexist remarks run directly contrary to this effort—and should be
prohibited similarly to negative remarks made about the judiciary. Akin to
Model Rule 8.4’s prohibition of negative comments pertaining to the
judiciary, a prohibition on public discriminatory and misogynistic
comments made by attorneys could be upheld as constitutional if analyzed
under the First Amendment.
C. A New Proposal for Modification
In determining what the new proposed language of Model Rule 8.4
should be, there are other templates. For example, in 1996, Andrew Taslitz
and Sharon Styles-Anderson proposed a modification of ABA Model Rule
8.4.177 They supported this proposal by arguing for an amendment drafted
narrowly to restrict attorney speech that is discriminatory with the intent to
intimidate while acting as a legal professional. 178 This is a good start;
however, it is too conservative of a rule in the modern context, considering
the realities the modern world faces as a result of the global proliferation of
daily internet use.
Instead, the ABA should adopt a broad rule that considers an attorney’s
discriminatory direct harassment of all individuals misconduct under Model
Rule 8.4. One option is drafting a new sub-category for Model Rule 8.4.
This new sub-category would be added to Model Rule 8.4 in defining what
is considered professional misconduct. This sub-category, (g), would state,
“Engage in speech that is discriminatory based upon race, sex, religion,
national origin, disability, age, sexual orientation or socioeconomic status.”
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If incorporating a whole new subcategory is not considered the best
option, the existing Model Rule 8.4 Comment 2 can be edited to broadly
prohibit this conduct.179 This is a simpler alternative, as all that must be
done is eliminate the present language, which prohibits this conduct only
when it is “in the course of representing a client[.]”
In the last proposed alternative, if the ABA does not wish to directly
address racist and sexist comments by prohibiting the conduct in the Model
Rule, it can instead adopt language that more broadly encompasses all
conduct that may raise an issue of whether an individual is fit to practice
law. For example, New York has adopted a rule that prohibits attorneys
from “conduct that adversely reflects on the lawyer’s fitness as a lawyer.”180
This is a rather discretionary rule and casts a wide net of all misconduct,
and it would be reasonable for a state bar disciplinary commission to
determine that an attorney who repeatedly harasses another individual
online to be unfit to practice law.181 This last alternative is the best option
for the ABA and is what should be adopted.
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D. Model Rule 8.4 Should Be Broadened
Simply, the broad formulation of Model Rule 8.4 that defines misconduct
as any conduct that is dishonest or prejudicial to the administration of
justice is the most constitutional solution for addressing the problem of
attorneys participating in hate speech. While the latter proposals are likely
constitutional due to the compelling interest of maintaining the public
image of the bar, to be safe, the ABA can circumvent the issue of drafting a
rule that can run afoul of the First Amendment by indirectly attacking this
conduct. Constructing a broad Rule 8.4 with language akin to New York’s
promulgated version will prevent a challenge of its constitutionality in this
circumstance, as a result of it being a content-based restriction similar to
R.A.V.182 An express prohibition of discriminatory remarks is analogous to
the legislation at issue in R.A.V., which only protected minority groups.183
Therefore, such a prohibition may be considered viewpoint discrimination
in First Amendment analysis.
By adopting language similar to New York’s, Model Rule 8.4, the ABA
will circumvent this analysis. Furthermore, it will provide state disciplinary
commissions more ammunition in their arsenal for disciplining attorneys
whose conduct does not fall within the provinces of the concrete rules in
place. Undoubtedly, there is a myriad of activities that should constitute
misconduct and that reflect adversely on an attorney’s ability to practice
law, but do not fit neatly within the rules. If disciplinary commissions were
provided with a discretionary rule such as the one proposed, they will be
better able to regulate attorneys admitted in their state bar.
If a narrow rule governing attorney speech were constructed only to
prevent misogynistic or racist remarks, it would not govern other speech
made by attorneys that is inherently harmful. For example, if an attorney
decides to develop and operate a revenge porn website for personal profit,
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the public will undoubtedly perceive such operation of a website negatively
and impute this negativity to the profession. Presently, running a website
like this is protected under the First Amendment, and the narrow rule
governing lawyers’ speech would not apply. Arguably, this type of behavior
negatively reflects on the character of the attorney and the attorney should
likely be disciplined for this misconduct. However, there is nothing
presently in the Model Rules that would enable a state bar to discipline this
individual. For this reason, a Model Rule 8.4 that broadly prohibits any
conduct that reflects negatively on an attorney’s character should be
adopted.
VII. CONCLUSION
The Constitution of the United States, the supreme law of our land,
ensures equal protection of all citizens regardless of their national origin,
creed, or race. Lawyers, as administrators of justice and officers of the
court, are instrumental in ensuring that US citizens’ rights are protected.
The goal of this nation is to ultimately become color-blind. Eventually US
citizens should not notice what skin color their neighbors possess. It should
simply be of no concern for them—just as the sky is blue or the grass is
green. Licensed attorneys who engage in hate speech undermine and
conflict with what the profession and the Constitution stand for. Therefore,
the ABA should adopt a Model Rule that would enable disciplinary
commissions to reprimand attorneys who engage in this conduct. Otherwise,
attorney commenters like Dybukk will continue to run amok on the internet
on websites such as AutoAdmit, and will make discriminatory and
misogynistic comments without any formal reprimand.
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